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COMMENT
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION - RETAINED POWERS UNDER
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 2036 (a) -
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972)
INTRODUCTION
A decedent's "gross estate" is determined by computing
the value of all of his property, both real and personal,
tangible and intangible, wherever situated at the time of his
death.' The value of the gross estate includes the value of
all of decedent's property "to the extent of [his] interest there-
in at his death."2 If the decedent has retained an interest in
any property which had been ostensibly transferred, his estate
is thereafter required to pay taxes on that property to the
extent of the decedent's retained interest.3 Conversely, prop-
erty over which the decedent had completely severed all
dominion and control at least three years prior to his death
cannot be included in his gross estate for tax purposes.
Because effective estate planning requires an understand-
ing of the subtle distinctions between retention and divest-
ment of control over transferred property, the Internal Reve-
nue Code specifically defines those inter vivos transfers con-
summated by the decedent which could create a semblance
of complete severance of control, but which would not, in
fact, divest the decedent of sufficient powers over the trans-
ferred property to escape estate tax consequences.
4
This comment deals with one such retained power -the
reservation of a life interest, defined in section 2036 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 5 Under this statutory provision,
I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
2 Id. § 2033.
3 Included in the decedent's gross estate is property that had been the
subject of a gratuitous, incomplete transfer during the decedent's life-
time.
4 CODE §§ 2035-40.
5 Id. § 2036 provides for transfers with retained life estates as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE - The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascer-
tainable without reference to his death or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death
(1) the possession or enjoyment of or the right to the
income from, the property, or
227
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the decedent's gross estate includes the value of all property,
transferred by trust or otherwise," under which the decedent
has retained for life7 either: (1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income from, the property or (2) the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or its income.8
I. THIE SCOPE OF 26 U.S.C. § 2036 (a)
A 1931 United States Supreme Court decision precipitated
the passage of the predecessor to section 2036.f0 Since the en-
actment of section 811 of the 1932 Code, the courts have re-
peatedly attempted to define and delineate its scope. These
judicial interpretations of section 811, and its successor, sec-
tion 2036(a), have brought the statute into somewhat sharper
focus. Nevertheless, the court decisions remain contradictory.' 0
The modern estate planner is still faced with the task of fer-
reting out those interpretations of section 2036(a) which can
be safely utilized as drafting guidelines.
Section 2036 (a) is divided into two main subsections. The
first attaches estate tax consequences to the donor's retention
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
(b) LIMITATION ON APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE- This section
shall not apply to a transfer made before March 4, 1931; nor
to a transfer made after March 3, 1931, and before June 7, 1932,
unless the property transferred would have been includible in
the decedent's gross estate by reason cf the amendatory lan-
guage of the joint resolution of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1516).
6 Where section 2036 is applicable, the amount included in the decedent's
gross estate is the value of the entire property transferred, less only
the value of any portion of the property which is not subject to the
decedent's interest and which is actually being enjoyed by another per-
son at the time of the decedent's death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (a) (1960).
7 The interest is taxable if retained for life or for any period not ascer-
tainable without reference to decedent's death or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death. For examples of the latter two
situations, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (i)-(ii) (1960).
8 This comment deals exclusively with subsections (1) and (2) of sec-
tion 2036 (a).
9 In May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), the Supreme Court held that
property is fully transferred for estate tax purposes even though the
settlor retains the right to income for life. The Supreme Court affirmed
May v. Heiner on March 2, 1931, indicating that the decision would not
be confined to its facts. On the very next day, March 3, 1931, Congress
responded to the Supreme Court decision by passing a Joint Resolution
which taxed all transferred property that was subject to a life interest
retained by the settlor. The President signed the Congressional Resolu-
tion into law that same day. Approximately one year later, on June 6,
1932, Congress reenacted the 1931 Resolution, although in somewhat
broader form. INT. REV. CODE OF' 1932, § 803 (a), 47 Stat. 279. The
language in that provision is identical to the language contained in §
2036 (a) of the 1954 Code.
" See pp. 229-30 infra.
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of possession or enjoyment or the right to the income from
the transferred property. A clear example of what would
constitute a taxable interest under this section is a reserva-
tion of a life estate.1 Similarly, a grantor who transferred
property in trust, retaining a right to the income therefrom
would subject his estate to taxation under section 2036 (a) (1).12
It makes no difference for estate tax purposes whether the
income retained consists of rental payments, 13 stock divi-
dends,' 4 or some other type of income.15 On the other hand,
if the use of transferred property for the benefit of the grantor
depends solely on the discretion of an independent trustee,
the transferred property will not be subjected to estate taxa-
tion.' Nor would such estate tax be imposed if the grantor
retained administrative powers only."'
The second part of section 2036(a) prohibits retention of
the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the transferred property or its income.' 8 The grantor who re-
tains the power to determine whether income is to be paid
to the life beneficiary or accumulated for the benefit of the
remainderman clearly holds a taxable interest under this sec-
tion.") A grantor reserving the power to terminate the trust,
thereby allowing premature distribution of the principal, simi-
larly subjects his estate to taxation under section 2036(a) (2).°2o
On the other hand, if the grantor's retained power to designate
is limited by an "ascertainable standard," no resulting estate
tax arises. 2' Similarly, if a grantor designates himself as one
of the trustees, his retained interest may escape future tax-
ation if the court determines that the grantor's "fiduciary
obligation" (as a trustee) to treat all beneficiaries with im-
It Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
32 Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564
(1943).
13 McNichols' Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
14 Varian v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1968).
1. United States v Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 ('1969).
16 Estate of Jack F. Chrysler, 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds,
361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
17 Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
18 It makes no difference, for estate tax purposes, whether the grantor
exercises this control alone or in conjunction with another person. Nor
dces it matter in what capacity the power is exercisable. Treas. Reg. §
20.2036-1(b) (3) (1960).
"' United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Biscoe v. United States,
148 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1957).
21 Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Holmes,
326 U.S. 480 (1946).
• Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Milton J. Bud-
long, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
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partiality provides a sufficient limitation on his reserved
powers.
22
These conflicting interpretative strains reach a discordant
crescendo in the following hypothetical. S, a settlor, trans-
fers property into an irrevocable trust. S retains powers which
are ostensibly administrative in nature. S is not a trustee nor
are his powers limited by an ascertainable standard, although
they substantially affect the beneficial enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property. In a case where all of these factors exist,
how should sections 2036(a) (1) and (2) be interpreted and
applied? Such is the question that faced the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum.
23
II. United States v. Byrum
A. The Facts
In 1958, decedent Milliken C. Byrum created an irrevocable
trust in which he placed shares of stock in three closely held
corporations. The trust instrument vested the corporate trustee
with broad managerial powers over the trust property, subject
to certain specified controls retained by the settlor. Byrum,
the settlor, reserved for himself the rights to (1) vote the
shares of unlisted stock held in the trust estate; (2) veto the
trustee's sale or transfer of any trust assets; (3) approve all
investments; and (4) remove the trustee, appointing another
corporate trustee to serve as successor.
24
Prior to the creation of the trust, Byrum had owned at
least 71 percent of the outstanding stock of each of the close
corporations. After the transfer, Byrum owned 59 percent of
the stock in one of the corporations and less than 50 percent
in each of the other two.25 Nevertheless, Byrum's reserved
right to vote all of the unlisted stock held in trust, when
combined with the voting rights he possessed over his own
shareholdings, gave him continued voting control of at least
2 Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
23 408 U.S. 125, petition for rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
24 Pertinent provisions of the trust instrument are quoted in a footnote
to the majority's decision. 408 U.S. at 127 n.1.




owned owned by Decedent
by Decedent by Trust and Trust
Byrum Lithographing
Co., Inc. 59 12 71
Graphic Reality, Inc. 35 48 83
Bychrome Co. 42 46 88
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71 percent of the common stock in each of the three cor-
porations.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that
the transferred stock should have been included in Byrum's
gross estate under section 2036(a). The Commissioner asserted
that Byrum's retained powers entitled him to "enjoyment of
. . .the property" 26 and, in addition, enabled him to deter-
mine the flow of dividends so as to "designate the persons
who shall . . . enjoy . . . the income. '27 The district court ruled
for Byrum's executrix on the cross motions for summary
judgment,28 and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision.
2
1
Certiorari was granted to review the important tax questions.
B. The Majority Opinion
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that Byrum's
retained powers over the trust assets did not render the trust
property includible in his gross estate. The majority opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Powell, is divided into two parts. The
first deals with the Government's arguments under section
2036 (a) (2) and the second deals with the Government's argu-
ments under section 2036(a) (1).
1. Section 2036(a) (2)
Initially the majority argues under section 2036(a) (2)
that a settlor's retention of managerial powers over the trust
assets does not subject his inter vivos trust to federal estate
tax.30 The Supreme Court cites several lower court opinions
which have upheld this theory,31 and Justice Powell contends
that these decisions may have been relied on in the drafting
of Byrum's and of hundreds of other inter vivos trusts.3 2 As
a derivative of this argument, the Court adds that interpre-
tations of the tax code with potentially far-reaching conse-
26CODE § 2036(a) (1).
27 Id. § 2036 (a) (2).
28 United States v. Byrum, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
2 9 United States v. Byrum, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
30 The Court cites McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931), to support
its proposition. 408 U.S. at 133. However, McCormick was decided be-
fore Congress had enacted the statutory predecessor to section 2036.
McCormick's validity under section 2036 is, therefore, not conclusive.
It should be noted at the outset that Byrum's retention of managerial
and administrative controls over the trust estate required him to pay
income tax on income from the property he had transferred into the
trust. See CODE §§ 675(4) (A), (B).
• 1 408 U.S. at 133 n.6.
:12 Justice Powell admonishes: 'The modification of this principle now
sought by the Government could have a seriously adverse impact, espe-
cially upon settlors (and their estates) who happen to have been 'con-
trolling' stockholders of a closely held corporation." Id. at 134-35.
1973
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quences should be left to the legislature, not to the courts.33
As a second basis for defeating the Government's argu-
ments under section 2036(a) (2), the majority enters into a
type of Hohfeldian analysis concerning the distinctions between
the legal terms "power" and "right." The word "right," accord-
ing to the majority, connotes an "ascertainable and legally
enforceable power. '34 Byrum's power to utilize his majority
position to vote the stock and thereby control the payment of
dividends35 was neither "ascertainable" nor "legally enforce-
able. ' 36 According to the court's analysis, it was a power but
not a right.
Third, whatever power Byrum may have exercised over
the directors and thereby over the flow of income to the bene-
ficiaries was restricted by Byrum's fiduciary duty as a majority
shareholder. Justice Powell argues that, as a majority share-
holder, Byrum had the obligation to promote the interests
of the corporation and would be subjected to a derivative ac-
tion should he fail to abide by that fiduciary standard.
3 7
The majority continues its argument by asserting that
even though Byrum did possess voting control, it does not
necessarily follow that he actually possessed the power to con-
trol dividends. Justice Powell suggests, in his fourth argu-
ment under section 2036(a) (2), that business and economic
variables provide the most potent influence over the declara-
tion of corporate dividends, not the person or persons possessed
of voting control.
38
33 In Justice Powell's opinion, "Congress is better equipped than a court to
define precisely the type of conduct which results in tax consequences."
Id. at 135.
34 Id. at 136.
35 Presumably control over the directors would be tantamount to control
over the payment of dividends. Under corporate law, it is the directors
who alone exercise authority over the declaration of dividends. See 1.1
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5320 (1971). The majority has
neglected to mention in support of its argument that the controlling
stockholder may, in fact, lack control over dividends in the case where
a dissident director refuses to follow his directions. In that event, the
controlling stockholder's only recourse is to remove the recalcitrant
director at the next election.
36 The majority considers the concept of "control" too vague and indefin-
able to constitute an "ascertainable" power. Generally, "control" con-
notes the right to vote more than 50 percent of the voting shares of a
corporation. However, "control" may exist in some instances where
there is a right to vote far less than 50 percent of the shares, depending
on factors such as the size of the corporation and the number of share-
holders. Therefore, the Court concludes, the idea of "control" is too
nebulous a concept to influence the ultimate determination of the case.
408 U.S. at 137-39 nn.10 & 13.
37 Id. at 137-38 n.ll.
:3 The Court argues that, in deciding whether or not to declare dividends,
the directors must balance the expectations of the shareholders against
corporate needs for retention of earnings. Justice Powell points out that
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2. Section 2036 (a) (1)
In the second part of its analysis, the Court opines that
the trust is not subject to taxation under the other statutory
provision - section 2036 (a) (1). The Court bases this decision
on two essential grounds. First, Justice Powell argues that the
word "enjoyment" in section 2036 (a) (1) refers to a present
economic benefit,3 9 such as an income interest or the lifetime
use of transferred property. The benefits which Byrum en-
joyed (his salary as an officer of the corporations and the
probability of continued employment in such capacity) were
neither "present economic benefits" nor assets independent
of other factors and constraints.
40
Second, the majority argues that the benefits which Byrum
derived from his position as controlling stockholder were not
the result of any "retained" powers.41 Section 2036(a) (1) re-
quires the decedent to have "made a transfer" under which
he has "retained" for life the "possession or enjoyment" of
"the property" transferred. Justice Powell contends that By-
rum's "enjoyment" was the result of his "control." However,
Byrum never transferred his "control," since the trust never
owned as much as 50 percent of the stock of any of the three
corporations. Therefore, according to the majority opinion,
Byrum did not divest himself of the property ("control!'),
subject to his retention of an attribute of that property. Rather,
he never lost possession of control. In the strained technical
interpretation of the majority opinion, Byrum may have main-
tained control, but he did not divest himself of it and sub-
excessive retained earnings may result in the imposition of a penalty tax.
CODE §§ 531-37. Moreover, accumulated earnings which are unreasonable
may subject the directors to a derivative action. 408 U.S. at 141.
Justice White's dissenting opinion explains that both of these
alleged deterrents to the accumulation of income are spurious. No
penalty tax is imposed until accumulated income exceeds $100,000.
CODE § 535(c). In practical terms, derivative suits for nonpayment of
dividends are rarely brought and almost never won, since the court may
label the decision to declare dividends one of "business judgment," not
subject to review. 408 U.S. at 158-59.
30408 U.S. at 145, citing Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
The Holmes decision defined "enjoyment" in the sense of the "present
right to immediate enjoyment" of the beneficiaries, not in reference to
the retained "enjoyment" of the settlor. Although Justice Powell cites
Holmes as authority for his position, it is important to note that the
Holmes case was decided in favor of the Commissioner.
40Justice Powell contends that, because of his position as majority share-
holder, Byrum's actions were restricted by (1) a fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders, and (2) the potential threat of derivative actions
against him.
41 With all due respect to the majority opinion, this argument is referred
to in the decision rather obliquely and presented by Justice Powell in a
somewhat cryptic manner. 408 U.S. at 148-49.
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sequently retain it. 42
C. A Critique of the Court's Analysis
Although the majority's opinion articulates several com-
pelling arguments against the Government's position,43 it fails to
grapple with the reality and the substance of Byrum's estate
planning scheme. Byrum did not "absolutely, unequivocally,
and irrevocably '44 divest himself of all interest in the trust.
Not only did he retain the right to vote the stock in trust, but
he also retained the right to veto any sale or transfer of the
trust assets. These two powers, when combined, gave Byrum
control over his own salary, stock dividends, corporate deci-
sions, and other matters vitally affecting the value of the
stock in the hands of the beneficiaries. By constricting the sale
or transfer of the stock out of trust, Byrum was free to chart
the course of each corporation's development and to control
42 Transfers are not taxed under section 2036 unless the decedent acquired
his life interest by retaining it in connection with his inter vivos transfer
of the the property. For example, suppose.S transferred property to T in
trust, instructing T either to pay the income to B or to accumulate it dur-
ing S's life. If T resigned as trustee and S were appointed in, his place,
the trust property would not be taxable to S's estate under section 2036
(a) (2) because, although S possessed the power to designate income
from the trust property, he did not retain this power in connection with
the transfer to the trust. Rather, he acquired it later by virtue of his
subsequent appointment as trustee.
43 In explaining his decision, Justice Powell warned that a holding in
favor of the Government would cause imminent problems in drawing
the line between Byrum and other cases. For example, if the dissenters
were victorious in this case, how would they rule in a case where the
settlor transferred stock into a trust and did not retain control via the
right to vote, but, by virtue of his own position as a majority share-
holder in the company, he, in fact, controlled the payment of dividends
to the shares in trust?
To Justice Powell, this hypothetical trust should not be taxable. To
the dissenters, however, such a trust might be subject to estate taxation.
Justice Powell is appalled by the inevitable result of the latter view.
Under that theory, a majority shareholder in a close corporation could
never transfer any of his shares into a trust (regardless of whether or
not he reserved fatal powers) without subjecting the trust to estate tax
consequences. As long as the settlor remained the majority shareholder,
the trust would be subject to estate taxation.
For a similar result, see Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 269,
cited by the dissent. 408 U.S. at 157 n.8.
Where a decedent transfers nonvoting stock in trust and holds
for the remainder of his life voting stock giving him control over
the dividend policy of the corporation, he has retained for a
period which did not in fact end before his death, the right to
determine the income from the nonvoting stock .... Since under
§ 20.2036-1 (b) (3) of the Estate Tax Regulations it is immaterial
in what capacity a power was exercisable by the decedent, it is
sufficient that the power was exercisable in the capacity of con-
trolling stockholder. Under the facts of this case, therefore, the
decedent has made a transfer with a reserved power within
the meaning of § 2036(a) of the Code.
44 United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 151 (1972) (dissenting opinion),




The facts of the case establish that Byrum refused to re-
linquish any of his retained powers prior to his death. Had
he done so, the trust would clearly have escaped estate tax
consequences. 41 Nevertheless, Byrum remained obdurate in his
retention of potentially fatal controls over the trust property.
1. Byrum's "enjoyment" of the property
A statutory analysis of section 2036(a) (1) uncovers sev-
eral flaws in the majority opinion. The Estate Tax Regula-
tions clearly state that "enjoyment" includes any "pecuniary
benefit" derived from the retained rights of the settlor.47 In
the instant case, Byrum's ability to vote his own salary was
a pecuniary advantage inuring to his benefit. Despite the trans-
fer of the stock into the trust estate, Byrum did retain a
present economic benefit (e.g., his salary), and, as a conse-
quence, his interest should have been subjected to estate tax-
ation under section 2036(a) (1).
4 8
In understanding why Byrum retained the "enjoyment"
of the transferred stock, it is helpful to examine his powers
in combination, rather than in isolation.49 Section 2036(a) ap-
plies to all powers retained by a decedent, whether expressly
reserved in the trust instrument or retained incident to the
transfer.5 0 The aggregation of Byrum's powers, both those ex-
pressly retained and those flowing from the shares not placed
in trust, assured him control of the close corporations for his
lifetime.
In several critical respects, Byrum was in essentially the
same position after the transfer as he had been before it oc-
curred. 51 He retained the right to an executive position with-
out fear of discharge. He retained the right to fix his com-
45 Byrum's retained powers thus gave him the right to prevent any public
sale of the corporate stock.
4, See CODE § 2033 and Estate of I.H. Burney, 4 T.C. 449 (1944). See also
Judge Aldrich's statement in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,
423 F.2d 601, 605 (1st Cir. 1970): "With the present settlor-trustee free
to determine the standard himself, a finding of ownership control was
warranted. To put it another way, the cost of holding onto the strings
[until death] may prove to be a rope burn."
47 Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (b) (2) (1960).
48 Under CODE section 2033, the decedent's gross estate includes the value
of all his property to the extent of his interest in it.
411 As long as thirty years ago, the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court
determined that a similar trust should be subject to estate taxation "on
an inclusive view of the whole arrangement." Estate of Pamelia D.
Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807, 814 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564, 565 (1943).
McNichols' Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
51 The Government makes this argument in its brief to the Supreme Court.
Brief for Appellant at 23.
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pensation and receive liberal retirement and fringe benefits.
He retained the power to determine if and when the corpora-
tion would be merged. And he retained the power to enjoy
these benefits as long as he so desired. These powers, which
are among the most important benefits associated with con-
trol of a closely held corporation,5 2 certainly constituted "pres-
ent economic benefits" and hence "enjoyment" of the trust
property.
5 3
2. Byrum's power to "designate"
Byrum's estate may have been taxable as well under sec-
tion 2036(a) (2) .4 Byrum did not make himself a trustee. As a
result, he was not bound by the fiduciary duties of a trustee
to treat the life tenants and remaindermen with impartiality.
5
The fiduciary duty which Justice Powell would have imposed
upon Byrum as a majority stockholder is a duty directed only
to minority stockholders. The facts of the Byrum case reveal
that, aside from the trust itself, the other minority stockhold-
ers in the three close corporations were persons unrelated to
Byrum. Arguably, Byrum could have fulfilled his fiduciary
obligations to these minority shareholders by withholding all
dividend payments, although nonpayment of dividends clearly
would have penalized the life tenants of the trust. Neverthe-
less, Byrum's fulfillment of his fiduciary duty to the minority
5 2 See 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 107 (1971), describing the bene-
fits of a controlling stock interest in a close corporation as follows:
Unlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held corpora-
tion, who may be simply an investor or a speculator and cares
nothing for the responsibilities of management, the shareholder
in a close corporation is a co-owner of the business and wants
the privileges and powers that go with ownership .... In his
capacity as an officer or employee of the corporation, he looks
to his salary for the principal return on his capital investment,
because earnings of a close corporation, as is well known, are
distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement
benefits.
Since a shareholder's principal income may depend on re-
tention of a position in the company and since his business and
social prestige may depend in part on the retention of a major
officership, naturally he is anxious to assure himself permanent
employment by the corporation (preferably as one of the major
officers), free from the possibility of discharge by the directors
or other shareholders.
53 In order for section 2036 (a) (1) to apply, it is not necessary for decedent
to retain all rights to enjoyment of the property. A partial retention of
enjoyment is sufficient to bring the trust within the statutory provision.
See Brief for Appellant at 25.
54 A trust is taxed under section 2036 (a) if it falls within the objectives
of either section 2036(a) (1) or section 2036 (a) (2). It does not need to
be taxable under both statutory provisions in order to be subject to
estate taxation.
55 Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962). For the general rule of
fiduciary duty imposed upon a trustee, see 3 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 236.11 (3d ed. 1967).
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shareholders would not have necessitated an awareness of the
particular needs of the life tenants of the trust.586 Therefore,
the fiduciary duty to which the court found Byrum bound was
not adequate to meet the requisite standard of impartiality. Be-
cause court enforcement of Byrum's alleged fiduciary duty to
minority shareholders did not have a bearing on his relationship
to the beneficiaries of the trust, Byrum's powers were not
within sufficient court control to escape taxation under section
2036 (a) (2) .5
Byrum's broad retention of powers left him with "some-
thing more than a memory. '58 In fact, the trustee's basic deter-
mination of whether or not to distribute dividend income was
completely dependent upon Byrum's prior decision -whether
or not to award the payment of dividends. Even though the
declaration of dividends is theoretically the function of all the
directors,' in practice, Byrum had the power to control the
directors' decision.60
Once the directorate had determined if, when, and how
many dividend payments to make, its determination was in-
sulated from judicial review by the court's allowance of discre-
tionary "business judgments."' ' With regard to dividend policy,
a director's fiduciary obligation requires only that he act hon-
estly and reasonably.62 Therefore, the directors in the three
closely held corporations controlled by Byrum were free to
exercise their powers in favor of nonpayment of dividends.
This course of action would have been fully consistent with the
fiduciary obligation imposed upon them as directors. Yet, its
inevitable consequence would have been to postpone beneficial
enjoyment of the trust shares until after Byrum's death.63 To
56 Indeed, in the proper exercise of his discretion .... decedent
may well have determined not to declare dividends even if the
current beneficiaries were in need of additional income. And,
with his absolute power to veto sales of trust assets, he could
have prevented the trustee from selling the stock and reinvest-
ing the proceeds in securities that would produce a greater
return.
Brief for Appellant at 20.
5T United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
"' Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608 (1948).
' 11 FLETCHER, supra note 35, § 5320.
If a majority of the directors were not amenable to Byrum's wishes, he
had the power to remove them at the very next annual election. A
controlling shareholder in a close corporation can thus change the com-
position of his corporation's board virtually at will. In so doing, he is
essentially assured that the directors will vote in accordance with his
wishes. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608 (1948).
W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1587 (4th ed. 1969).
62 G. BocEsr, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 841 (2d ed. 1962).
'3 Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
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that extent, Byrum's control over the directors' decision pro-
vided him with the power to "designate" within the meaning of
section 2036 (a) (2) 64
Byrum's aggregation of retained rights clearly gave him
the power to substantially affect the pecuniary enjoyment of the
beneficiaries. Still, the trust instrument specified no ascertain-
able standard to guide Byrum in the exercise of his power.65
The broad discretion vested in Byrum, both as a director and
as a majority shareholder, would have inhibited a court of
equity from intervening against him, except upon a showing of
unreasonableness or bad faith. 6 As a result, any fiduciary obli-
gation which might have been imposed upon Byrum would,
in fact, have provided neither an ascertainable standard nor a
meaningful limitation upon his reserved rights and powers. 7
Absent an external standard, the trust should have been
subject to estate taxation under section 2036(a) (2) in order to
comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court's earlier de-
cision in United States v. O'Malley.6 s O'Malley had held that
the grantor's power to accumulate trust income could be deemed
the power to "designate" under section 2036 (a) (2), so that all
of the trust principal (including portions representing accumu-
lated income) was includible in the grantor's gross estate. Re-
gardless of whether the O'Malley holding should control the
outcome in Byrum,69 the Court is still bound to favor substance
over form by looking to the practical effects of Byrum's aggre-
gation of powers. Because of Byrum's actual control over
almost every important facet of the trust estate, his "irrevoc-
able" transfer was, in reality, no transfer at all.
It is no solace to those who advocate the triumph of sub-
64 It is no defense to the application of section 2036 (a) (2) that Byrum's
control over dividend policy was exercisable through the boards of
directors of the three corporations, rather than by him individually.
The statutory provision applies regardless of whether the power is
exercisable "alone or in conjunction with any person." See Brief for
Appellant at 14.
63 The estate tax requirement of an "ascertainable standard" to limit a
fidiciary's discretionary powers was clearly articulated in Jennings v.
Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
66 See notes 61-63 supra.
6T Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir. 1970).
68 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
69 The Government argued in its brief to the Supreme Court that Byrum's
retained power to vote and thereby to increase or decrease corporate
dividends enabled him to shift or defer beneficial enjoyment in a man-
ner much like the power to "accumulate" income. The power to ac-
cumulate was held clearly taxable under section 2036 in United States
v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 631 (1966). Therefore, the Government




stance over form' that Justice Powell would prefer decisions
with "far-reaching" tax consequences to be handled by the
legislature rather than the courts.' This separation of powers
concept, although valid in theory, should not permit the Su-
preme Court to escape its duty to interpret the existing statute
in harmony with its express provisions and implied purposes.
7 2
A restrictive reading of section 2036(a), grounded on the fear
of expanding its tax consequences, may indeed precipitate a
further and more "far-reaching" effect by creating an unin-
tended tax loophole.'
3
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion presents a persuasive argument in
rebuttal to the majority's "reliance" theory.' 4 Mr. Justice White
examines the state of the case law at the time that Byrum's
trust was created and concludes that Byrum could not have
rationally relied on legal precedent when he created his trust,
nor could he have reasonably assumed that his retained powers
over the trust property would have enabled it to escape future
estate taxation.'
5
The dissent's flaw is the overextension of its logic. It need
not have gone as far as it did in deeming O'Malley controlling.'
6
The case before the Byrum Court presented a situation in
which the settlor maintained actual control over property
ostensibly divested. It was the aggregation of powers over stock
in a closely held corporation which should have subjected
Byrum's trust to estate taxation. 7' If Byrum had retained only
one of the enumerated powers,'8 the case might have been cor-
rectly decided in his favor. Similarly, in a case where the set-
tlor remained a majority shareholder in a closely held corpora-
tion, even after he had transferred some of his shares into an
74 United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 321 (1969); Commissioner
v. Church, 335 U.S. 632, 643-46 (1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 114, 116-18 (1940).
71 408 U.S. at 135.
72 The legislative history of section 2036 reveals that the clear intent of
Congress was to tax those trusts which had formerly avoided estate
taxation despite the settlor's retention of a life interest. See 74 CONG.
REc. 7198 (1931) (remarks of Congressman Hawley).
73 408 U.S. at 153 (dissenting opinion).
.4 408 U.S. at 162-68.
75 The dissenters might have added that the Court was confronted only
with the facts of Byrum's trust. In deciding the Byrum case, it was
not incumbent upon the Court to speculate upon the possible reliance of
other settlors.
7, 408 U.S. at 156.
77Compare State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir.
1959). Had the State Street case concerned retention of powers over
stock in a closely held corporation, perhaps it would still be good law.
7S See p. 230 supra for a list of Byrum's retained powers.
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irrevocable trust without retaining the right to vote the trans-
ferred shares, the settlor's control over dividends should not
subject the trust to estate tax consequences, as long as he
retained no other vital controls over the trust property.79 As
distinguished from the above hypothetical situations, Byrum's
trust should have been subject to estate taxation because
of his broad retention of powers, which were tantamount to
virtual control of the trust.
III. FORECAST FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the valid arguments which can be made in opposi-
tion to the majority opinion, the decision in United States v.
Byrum has set some definable standards for drafting future
trust instruments. What the holding in Byrum has settled is
that a settlor may possess the following retained powers with
estate tax impunity: (1) The right to vote transferred shares;
(2) the right to veto sale or transfer of trust assets by the
trustee; and, (3) the right to remove the trustee as successor.
Byrum seems to extend the decision in Old Colony Trust,
which had held that purely administrative powers are immune
from estate taxation. As a consequence of Byrum, even the
retention of administrative powers which have a substantial
effect on beneficial enjoyment will not render a trust taxable
under section 2036(a).
There are, however, important tax questions remaining
after the Byrum decision. To begin with, one may query
whether powers similar, but not identical, to those held in
Milliken Byrum's trust are still subject to taxation. For exam-
ple, what result if the settlor transferred stock in a closely held
corporation and retained the power to control all investment
decisions? A recent Tax Court Memorandum Decision8 1 has
held that this type of retained power, although different from
the powers retained in Byrum, would still not subject the trust
to estate taxation. The Tax Court based its decision on the
Supreme Court's holding in Byrum.s8 2 One can infer from this
extension of Byrum that the courts may be moving toward a
narrower reading of section 2036 (a) and the restrictions which
it imposes upon the settlor. Notably, the retained power to
control trust investments is not taxable even when the settlor
can direct the trustee to invest in all wasting assets, to the
79 The question of how this type of case should be treated is raised in
note 44 supra.
80 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. .1970). Old Colony overruled State Street Trust
Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (lst Cir. 1959).
81 Estate of Arthur Chalmers, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 158 (1972).
82 The Tax Court held that, "While the facts in the Byrum case may be
dissimilar to the facts before this court, it is controlling here." Id.
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distinct pecuniary detriment of the, remaindermen.8 3
It is still questionable whether the Supreme Court would
have decided Byrum differently had the settlor transferred
all of his controlling stock into the trust estate, reserving the
right to vote the shares in trust. Does this situation fall within
the statutory language of section 2306 (a) as interpreted by Jus-
tice Powell? Clearly the settlor would have retained the control
subsequent to its transfer. He would have parted with the
property (the controlling stock), and then retained a portion
of it (voting control). Reading the statutory language nar-
rowly, the situation posed here is distinguishable from that in
Byrum, where the settlor possessed the control, in part, by
virtue of his own shareholdings which were never transferred
into the trust estate.
8 4
It is not entirely clear from Justice Powell's opinion
whether the majority of the Supreme Court in Byrum would
have ruled against the Government in the hypothetical situa-
tion presented above. One may indeed query whether future
estate tax decisions will focus on the technicalities of the statu-
tory language, ignoring both the substantive effect of the trust
instrument and the equities of the particular situation.
The salient question left unanswered is whether Byrum
will be limited to its facts. The Court may have focused on
the existence of unrelated minority shareholders in the Byrum
case. If that particular fact were crucial to the majority's
decision, then perhaps Byrum would, indeed, be limited to its
particular fact pattern. In most closely held corporations, there
are no unrelated minority shareholders. Therefore, in these
situations, the fiduciary duties imposed upon Byrum as a
majority shareholder would have no real significance since the
possibility of a derivative action would constitute even less of
a threat where all the minority shareholders were related to
the settlor.
If the Byrum decision is confined to its unique fact pattern,
the effect of the decision on future estate planning will be
marginal. If, to the contrary, Byrum is not so limited, the
net effect of the decision may invite future settlors to "divest"
themselves of property without divesting themselves of con-
comitant power.
United States v. Byrum would appear to condone the set-
8 Id.; Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962). It is important to
note, however, that in the King case, the securities in question "were at
no time significant from the point of view of control of the particular
companies involved." Id. at 974.
8 408 U.S. at 148-49.
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tlor's retention of broad administrative powers, regardless of
their ultimate effect upon the beneficial enjoyment of the trust
property. If taken literally, Byrum seems to encourage the
estate planning lawyer to advise his client how to part with
property for estate tax purposes and still retain the vital powers
over it for practical purposes. The negative fiscal consequences
to the federal government resulting from a large number of
such estate planning schemes could precipitate the Congres-
sional enactment of more stringent tax legislation.
8 5
CONCLUSION
Section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was
designed to tax those inter vivos transfers of property under
which the transferor retained substantial powers and controls
until his death. Examples of such retained controls under
section 2036 are: (1) a life estate; (2) a right to income; and
(3) a right to designate who shall possess or enjoy the trans-
ferred property or its income.
In United States v. Byrum the Supreme Court decided that
a settlor's reservation of the rights to vote shares of stock in a
closely held corporation and to veto the transference of such
shares out of the trust estate failed to constitute a retained
"interest" in property under section 2036(a). The majority
decision allowed the trust to escape estate taxation, despite
Byrum's broad retention of control. The Court's opinion focused
on the nature of the powers retained, rather than on their sub-
stantive effect.
Under a more critical approach to the case, highlighting
the substance rather than the form, Byrum's aggregation of
powers should have rendered his estate liable for taxation of
the trust. Nevertheless, given the holding in Byrum, it is now
incumbent upon future estate planners to contemplate and upon
future courts to articulate the extent to which controlling inter-
ests of settlors will be taxed under section 2036. If a further
judicial clarification of the applicability of Byrum is not soon
forthcoming, estate planners may be wisest to view Byrum as
limited to its facts.
Jane M. Talesnick
85 A study of legislative tax history indicates that Congress has frequently
reacted to tax loopholes by enacting stricter statutory taxing provisions.
As noted in note 9 supra, the predecessor to section 2036 was passed
into law as a response to the Supreme Court decision in May v. Heiner,
281 U.S. 238 (1930).
Justice Cardozo once astutely stated that continually revised tax
legislation is essential "to keep pace with the fertility of invention
whereby taxpayers [contrive] to keep the larger benefits of ownership
and be relieved of the attendant burdens." Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S.
670, 676 (1933).
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